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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
TAX FRAUD AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
TAXPAYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the statutory authority
to assess both civil and criminal fraud penalties against those who
attempt to evade or actually do evade any tax due under the Internal
Revenue Code. While the civil and criminal fraud sanctions are
theoretically different, they have become closely identified in recent
cases involving tax evasion. At present, it is conceivable that the IRS
can invoke both sanctions in every case of tax evasion. Indeed, the
fusion of these two sanctions has been encouraged by substantial judi-
cial approval. However, in the context of a single case of tax evasion,
the possibility of the use of both of these sanctions, with their sig-
nificantly different consequences, has resulted in considerable con-
fusion and uncertainty regarding the extent of the taxpayer's
constitutional rights as compared with those afforded defendants in
other types of criminal prosecutions.
This comment will examine the relationship between the civil and
criminal sanctions and the role which the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata play in those instances in which the IRS
decides to invoke both sanctions. Furthermore, the civil-criminal tax
fraud investigation will be examined with a view toward determining
the impact of Miranda upon that process. Finally, the effect of the
ft'sion of the civil and criminal fraud sanctions on the ability of the
IRS to obtain discovery of the taxpayer's books and records within
the constitutional requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
will be considered.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
TAX FRAUD
A. Characteristics of Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud
The civil penalty for fraudulent income tax evasion is contained in
Section 6653 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. The primary criminal
tax fraud penalty appears in section 7201. 1
 The courts that have in-
terpreted these sections have held that the elements of fraud requisite
1 There are other criminal sanctions in the Internal Revenue Code. Sec Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, In 7202-215. Of these, the most significant are § 7203 (making it a misde-
meanor for willfully failing to file or pay a tax) and 17206(1) (making it a felony for
submitting a return not believed to be true and correct as to every material matter). The
government may also prosecute fraudulent taxpayers for offenses proscribed in Title 18,
U.S. Code. The following provisions of Title 18 are potential weapons in the arsenal of
the IRS: 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964) conspiracy; 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) alder or abettor;
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964) false statements; 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1964) false, fictitious or
fraudulent claims on the U.S. Government; 18 U.S.C. § 1612 (1964) perjury. For a com-
prehensive discussion of these sanctions, see Comment, Fraud Under Federal Tax Law: A
Review of Substantive Offenses, 1968 U. of III. L. F. 431 (1968).
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for the use of both of these provisions are identical. 2 Section 6653 (b),
the civil fraud penalty, stipulates that "any part of any underpayment
.. shall be added to the tax [in] an amount equal to 50 percent of
the underpayment." The section defines "underpayment" as a defi-
ciency and provides that the fifty percent penalty may be imposed on
the entire deficiency even though a part of the deficiency was not due
to fraud.3 The fraud contemplated by this section does not presume
negligence. Rather, it refers to "actual, intentional wrongdoing, and
the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to
be owing."' Section 7201, the criminal fraud section, makes it a
felony for any person willfully to attempt in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code . 5 Upon con-
viction, a fine of up to $10,000 or five years imprisonment, or both,
is authorized. The essential elements of this offense are three.° First,
an affirmative act constituting an attempt to evade or defeat taxes
must be shown.? Secondly, "willfullness" must be proven.' Finally, an
additional tax due and owing is a prerequisite to conviction.'
2 See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 962 (1965).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, { 6653(c) ; see also Lipton, The Relationship Between the
Civil and Criminal Penalties for Tax Frauds, 1968 U. of Ill. L. F. 527 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Lipton].
4 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941).
° Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 7201 provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other pen-
alties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution.
6 See generally Schmidt, Corroboration of Admissions in Criminal Income Tax Pros-
ecutions, 37 U. Det, L.J. 173 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Schmidt].
7 Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498-99 (1943). In Spies, the Supreme Court
made clear that the "affirmative attempt" required was not bound up with the complex-
ities of the common law crime of attempt. Id. at 498. The Court stressed that the attempt
alone was the consummated, independent crime, regardless of success or failure of the at-
tempt, and that the affirmative act had to include a positive commission rather than a
mere omission. To illustrate its position the Court stated:
By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would think affir-
mative willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as keeping a double
set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or documents,
destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or covering up sources of
Income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions
of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or
to conceal.
Id. at 499.
8 The element of willfullness requires some degree of "evil motive and want of jus-
tification in view of all the financial circumstances of the taxpayer." Id. at 498. See also
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933). In addition to the specific intent
required, willfulness can only be proven by independent evidence. It cannot be Inferred
solely from an understatement of income. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139
(1954).
0 See Schmidt, supra note 6, at 174. See also Baiter, How to Defend a Tax Evasion
Case Before Criminal Charges are Brought, 19 J. Taxation 162 (1963).
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The three elements required under section 7201 are the same ele-
ments required for an assessment under section 6653 (b)." Each statute
requires a deficiency—the "underpayment" of section 6653(b); the
"tax due and owing" of section 7201. Further, the "willfullness" ele-
ment of section 7201 is equivalent to the "due to fraud" phrase of sec-
tion 6653(b)." Finally, the affirmative attempt necessary for convic-
tion under the criminal statute has as its civil counterpart an "actual,
intentional, wrongdoing." 12 The fact that the concept of fraud and the
elements required to prove fraud are identical under both the civil
and criminal sanctions of the Code cannot be overemphasized because
it has crucial significance with respect to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel." The identity between the two sections has further sig-
nificance because the imposition of one sanction by the government
does not bar the imposition of the other." Conceivably, each penalty
might be imposed in every case of tax evasion. This latter possibility
gives a tax fraud investigation a dual nature and generates issues con-
cerning the point at which the Miranda warnings should attach, and
whether or not discovery obtained by means of an administration sub-
poena issued by the IRS may be used in a criminal prosecution.
Helvering v. Mitchell° illustrates the choice the government has
with regard to the fraud sanctions. In Helvering, the taxpayer was
acquitted of a criminal evasion charge involving an alleged fraudulent
deduction for stock loss and a substantial omission of income. Follow-
ing acquittal, the Commission assessed the deficiency in tax and the
fifty percent civil fraud penalty against the taxpayer. The Commis-
sioner's position was affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals." The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed the assess-
ment of the civil fraud penalty on the grounds that acquittal of the
criminal fraud charge barred imposition of the civil fraud penalty.'
The Commissioner's successful appeal to the Supreme Court resulted
in a holding that the imposition of the civil penalty for tax fraud was
not barred by acquittal in the criminal fraud proceedings." The Su-
10 See Lipton, supra note 3, at 528; Batter, Three New Cases Hold Criminal Tax
Conviction "Proves" Civil Fraud, 24 J. Taxation 158, 159 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Batterl.
11
 Lipton, supra note 3, at 528.
12 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941).
Is Sec p. 1181 infra.
14
 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) ; Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
495 (1943), where the Court stated:
The penalties imposed by Congress to enforce the tax laws embrace both
civil and criminal sanctions. The former consist of additions to the tax upon de-
terminations of fact made by an administrative agency and with no burden on
the Government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The latter consist
of penal offenses enforced by the criminal process in the familiar manner. Invo-
cation of one does not exclude resort to the other. (Emphasis added.)
15 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
16
 32 B.T.A. 1093.
IT Mitchell v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1937).
16 303 U.S. at 398-400.
	
. •
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preme Court in Helvering rejected the taxpayer's arguments based
upon res judicata and double jeopardy." The Court held that the res
judicata doctrine was not applicable because of the differing burdens
of proof involved in criminal and civil tax fraud proceedings2° Further,
the Court stated that double jeopardy cannot occur in the enforcement
of a civil sanction and pointed out that Congress clearly intended the
fifty percent penalty for fraud to be remedial and civil in nature.'
Similarly, it has been held that a conviction does not bar imposition
of the civil penalty."
While the elements of civil and criminal fraud are identical, there
are. some differences with respect to the two sanctions. The civil
penalty, remedial in character, is intended as a safeguard for the pro-
tection of revenue. It is intended to defray the expenses incurred by
the government in investigating deficiencies stemming from fraud."
The criminal sanction, on the other hand, being primarily penal in
nature, has deterrence as one of its primary objectives. 24 It is designed
to insure prompt compliance with the duties imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code." Additionally, the burdens of proof on the govern-
ment differ in civil and criminal fraud cases. In the former, the gov-
ernment must establish its case by "clear and convincing evidence."
In the criminal context, the "reasonable doubt" standard is applied.
Basically, a greater degree of "evil motive" or "bad purpose" is re-
quired under section 7201. Some writers have suggested that this
difference is largely theoretical." A more practical distinction between
the civil and criminal fraud sections exists with respect to the appli-
cable statute of limitations. In cases of criminal fraud, the statute of
limitations is six years." However, there is no limitation period for
civil fraud28 The civil penalty may even be assessed against the estate
of a deceased taxpayer."
19 Id.
20 Id. at 403-04.
21 Id. at 399.
22 See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379
'U.S. 962 (1965): See also Lipton, supra note 3, at 527.
28 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
24 See Lipton, supra note 3, at 532, quoting IRS Audit Division Manual, ch. 4500,
P-4560-3 (1960).
25 See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495-97 (1943).
26 See Lipton, supra note 3, at 529-30; Baiter, supra note 10, at 158-59.
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6531.
2B Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501(c) (1) and Lipton, supra note 3, at 528-30. See
also Roby and Ireland, Rights of the Federal Taxpayer, 46 Taxes 200 (1968). This latter
article contains a dramatic illustration of the absence of a limitations period with respect
to the civil fraud penalty by making reference to Stillman v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 282
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 828 (1955). In , Silliman, deficiencies were asserted against
a former Judge of a Hawaii court for the taxable years 1924 and 1926. The deficiencies
were asserted in 1952 when the judge was 77 years old. The criminal statute had long
since run, but under the civil fraud provision the government was still able to collect a
deficiency of $235,000, a civil 50% fraud penalty of $117,000, plus interest of $380,000.
Cases of this sort, however, are unlikely to arise frequently because the government will
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Assuming there are no statute of limitations considerations, the
theoretically easier burden of proof under the civil fraud provision
does not result in IRS preference of that sanction to the criminal'
fraud penalties. In fact, it is the avowed policy of the IRS to give
overriding importance to the criminal aspects of a tax fraud investiga-
tion, and to hold in abeyance the civil aspects." In any event,
the decision to prosecute is within the discretion of the IRS." The
policy behind the decision to prosecute for criminal fraud appar-
ently varies from time to time. In prior years, the IRS attempted to
enhance the deterrent effect of the criminal fraud provisions by prose-
cuting cases involving even small deficiencies." Also, in former years
the element of willfulness was deemphasized. 83 In more recent years,
however, the practice of the IRS has been to give greater consideration
to mitigating factors, such as the smallness of the deficiency, while
placing greater emphasis upon the factor of willfulness." Before prose-
cuting under the criminal fraud sections, however, the IRS requires
that there be sufficient evidence to establish the fraud and a reason-
able probability of conviction." Even where the Service is satisfied
that these requirements exist, serious illness of the taxpayer and a
voluntary disclosure by him are factors which the IRS would consider
in determining whether or not to recommend criminal prosecution to
the Justice Department, the agency which makes the final decision
and which actually handles the prosecution. 8° Another facet of the
criminal and civil fraud relationship is worthy of mention. Imposition
of the civil fraud penalty usually follows the prosecution for criminal
fraud.87
 The reverse situation—criminal prosecution following civil
assessment—is unlikely under current IRS policy."
generally lose unless it can place into evidence the return for the year in question. Rou-
tine destruction of individual returns after 8 years is currently practiced so that cases
similar to Judge Silliman's should be rare. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 528 n.6.
29 Estate of Louis L. Briden, 11 T.C. 1095 (1948), aff'd sub nom. Kirk v. Commis-
sioner, 179 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1950).
80 Lipton, supra note 3, at 532.
81 Id. at 530.
32 See Baiter, How to Defend a Tax Evasion Case Before Criminal Charges are
Brought, 19 J. Taxation 162, 166 (1963).
88
 Id.
34 See Lipton, supra note 3, at 531.
as See Id., where the author writes:
The Service has a two-fold standard in deciding whether or not to recom-
mend criminal prosecution. There must be sufficient evidence to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and there must be a reasonable probability of con-
viction. Due consideration is given to all the facts and circumstances in deter-
mining whether a case warrants a recommendation for prosecution or should be
disposed of on the basis of the civil liability only.
38 Id.
87 Id. at 538. See also Baiter, supra note 10; Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d
262 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965) ; Armstrong v. United States, 354
F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
88 Lipton, supra note 3, at 533-34.
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The fact that the civil and criminal tax fraud relationship is char-
acterized by identity of legal concept and factual element is unfor-
tunate for the taxpayer subjected to a tax fraud investigation. This is
so because of the tremendous aid furnished the IRS by the doctrine
of collateral estoppel in pursuing both the criminal and civil aspects
of the fraud investigation.
B. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel and the Civil-Criminal
Tax Fraud Relationship
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when an attempt
is made to litigate a fact previously litigated in an earlier suit involving
a different action." The doctrine may be invoked to estop a person
from relitigating a fact only if the following conditions are met. 4°
First, the fact at issue in the original suit must have been identical
to the fact at issue in the second suit. Secondly, the same legal prin-
ciples must apply in the second suit. Finally, both parties, or persons
in privity with them, must have been participants in the earlier suit:
The doctrine appiles to both criminal and civil cases 41
The doctrine of collateral estoppel lurks as a menacing foe to
the taxpayer under investigation for tax evasion. The fact that the
elements of sections 7201 (criminal) and 6653(b) (civil) have been
deemed identical gives the doctrine great vitality in tax fraud cases."
For example, a number of cases have held that conviction for criminal
fraud establishes the existence of civil fraud under section 6653 (b). 43
The taxpayers involved were held to be collaterally estopped from intro-
ducing any evidence on the question of fraud in the civil proceedings."
The rationale underlying these decisions was the view that the "willful
attempt to evade" under section 7201 included all the elements neces-
sary for civil fraud under 6653 (b)—the only difference being the
greater burden of proof required in the criminal case." On the other
hand, as previously mentioned," the prior criminal acquittal of a tax-
payer does not allow him to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel
89 It should be noted that res judicata differs from collateral estoppel. The former
doctrine bars relitigation of issues involving the same cause of action. It puts an end to
that cause of action, thereby preventing its relitigation on any ground except fraud or
lack of jurisdiction. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
42 See id. at 598-99.
41 Lipton, supra note 3, at 534.
42
 Since the doctrine requires identity of factual and legal issues in the second suit,
the IRS would probably not succeed in attempting to have It applied in civil proceedings
following convictions for criminal tax fraud violations not comprising all the elements of
5 6653(b). For example, under § 7203 (failure to file), it is not necessary for the pros-
ecution to prove intent to evade or that a tax was due—both elements are prerequisites
to assessment of the civil penalty under 5 6653(b).
42
 Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962
(1965) ; Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Amos v. Commissioner,
360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Armstrong v. United States, 354 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
44 Id.
46 Baiter, supra note 10; Lipton, supra note 3, at 533-35.
46 See p. 1178 supra.
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in a civil fraud proceeding'? Thus, in a sense, the collateral estoppel
doctrine is a "one way street"" in that it aids the government in tax
fraud cases but is of no assistance whatsoever to the taxpayer. The
only instance where it could possibly be of assistance to the taxpayer
would be if he prevailed on the issue of fraud in a civil case and then
invoked the doctrine in a subsequent criminal proceeding. However,
under current IRS policy,, a decision to proceed first with the civil
fraud sanction will not be followed with a criminal prosecution." Thus,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel affects the relationship of civil and
criminal tax fraud in a way totally beneficial to the government and
totally detrimental to the taxpayer. 5° For this reason, the application
of the doctrine to the civil and criminal tax fraud cases has often been
criticized."
The tax fraud investigation routinely begins as an audit to deter-
mine civil liability. The taxpayer may surprisingly learn, however,
that the possibility for criminal prosecution has arisen. This dual
nature of the tax fraud investigation, coupled with the potency of the
collateral estoppel doctrine in favor of the government, makes the con-
stitutional rights of the taxpayer in the non-custodial tax fraud in-
vestigation a matter of critical importance.
II. THE Miranda WARNINGS IN TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
For the past several years a controversy has existed among judges
and legal writers as to whether, or at what stage, Miranda warnings"
must be given during a non-custodial tax fraud investigation. It is in
this area that the civil-criminal fraud dichotomy becomes increasingly
important. In determining civil liability no constitutional warnings are
required. However, once the decision to pursue the criminal fraud
47 The rationale for denying the acquitted taxpayer the use of collateral estoppel is
the fact of the higher burden of proof on the government in the criminal proceeding. The
government can fail to meet its burden there yet still may meet its lesser burden in the
subsequent civil proceeding. See Baiter, supra note 10, and Lipton, supra note 3, at 534.
45 See Baiter, note 10 supra.
4 i1
 See text at note 38 supra.
50
 It should be noted that a plea of guilty in a criminal proceeding allows invocation
of the doctrine by the IRS in a civil proceeding. A plea of nolo contendere will not bar
litigation of the civil fraud penalty; however, the Justice Department and IRS normally
oppose such a plea and some courts, therefore, will not accept it. In attempted settlements
of the civil penalty the IRS will also consider a nolo plea tantamount to a guilty plea
and will likely be inflexible on this point. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 536-38.
51 See Comment, Collateral Estoppel in Civil Tax Fraud Cases Subsequent to Crim-
inal Conviction, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 317 (1965). Other objections to the application of the
doctrine to the civil fraud proceeding are that it deprives the taxpayer of his statutory
right to have the Tax Court review the Commissioner's determination, or to have a jury
determine the issue in a district court, and that the more rigid rules of evidence in a
criminal case might exclude evidence favorable to the taxpayer which would have been
admissible in the subsequent civil proceeding but for the doctrine. Id.
52 These warnings are: (I) the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement made
may be used against the person undergoing interrogation; (3) the right to consult and
have present an attorney; and (4) the right to have an appointed attorney in the event
of indigency. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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aspect is made, and the assessment for civil fraud becomes secondary,
the Miranda issue assumes great significance. The substantial disagree-
ment among courts and commentators as to the accrual of a taxpayer's
constitutional rights in a tax fraud investigation makes this issue
worthy of reexamination."
In 1964, in Escobedo v. Illinois," the Supreme Court held that
when the process of governmental interrogation shifts from investi-
gatory to accusatory—when the investigation focuses on the accused
and the purpose becomes to elicit a confession—the adversary system
begins to operate and the accused must be permitted to consult with
counsel. In Escobedo, the defendant was in the physical custody of
the police and was questioned in the police station interrogation
room." Any information obtained under these circumstances, the
Court held, could not be admitted into evidence.
In 1966, the constitutional rights of the suspect were further
clarified by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona." In the latter
decision, the Supreme Court expanded its Escobedo decision by hold-
ing that evidence obtained from a person subjected to custodial inter-
rogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was warned of his right to
counsel, retained or appointed, and of his privilege against self-in-
crimination." The Court explained its decision by stating: "By custo-
dial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way."" (Emphasis
added.) Miranda, like Escobedo, was in police custody and questioned
in an interrogation room at the police station. This factual situation is
important, as is the italicized portion of the above quoted extract from
Miranda, for both give leverage, respectively, to either a narrow or
broad interpretation of the applicability of the Miranda warnings."
Shortly after Escobedo, the Ninth Circuit applied its constitu-
tional mandates to a criminal tax fraud investigation. In Kohatsu v.
United States," the issue concerned whether the accusatory stage had
been reached when a routine civil audit shifted to a criminal investiga-
tion owing to the appearance in the case of a special agent from the
Intelligence Division of the IRS." Periodically, before the appearance
of the special agent, the taxpayer and a revenue agent from the Audit
55 Compare Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1011 (1966), with United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
n4 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
55 Id. at 490-91.
DO 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
ET See note 52 supra.
58 384 U.S. at 444.
59 See, e.g., Note, The Shift of Emphasis Theory: Constitutional Rights of Taxpayers
in Criminal Fraud Investigations in Light of Miranda v. Arizona, 20 Syr. L. Rev. 725,
729-730 (1969).
ao 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
al The Intelligence Division of IRS has jurisdiction over criminal investigations. Its
investigators are known as special agents.
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Division of the IRS had held meetings in which books and records
of the taxpayer were examined. For nearly two years after the appear-
ance of the special agent in the case, the taxpayer continued to give
information, unaware that the investigation had shifted from civil to
criminal, and without having been warned of his constitutional rights.
These events occurred before the decision in Escobedo was rendered.
The taxpayer nonetheless contended that under Escobedo the evidence
obtained after the investigation had shifted from civil to criminal was
inadmissible. At this point, he argued, the investigation focused on him
and the accusatory stage had been reached. The government countered
with the argument that since the function of the revenue agent was to
ascertain civil liability, and that of the special agent was to investigate
any alleged violations and make recommendations, the accusatory
stage, within the meaning of Escobedo, had not been reached. The
court agreed with the government, holding that the accusatory stage
had not been reached and that the focus upon a particular suspect re-
ferred to in Escobedo was not applicable in this situation.' The court
distinguished Escobedo by stressing the fact that in Escobedo an un-
solved crime existed for which the accused had been arrested. The tax
fraud investigation differed in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit be-
cause, in this situation, the function of the agents was to determine
whether in fact a crime had been committed." Moreover, the court in
Kohatsu noted that no arrest or indictment characterized the situation.
The Kohatsu distinction between an unsolved crime and a crimi-
nal tax fraud investigation, the purpose of which is to determine if a
crime has been committed, has been strongly criticized by both legal
writers" and judges." Criticism has been directed at the emphasis the
Kohatsu court placed upon the exploratory nature of the criminal tax
fraud investigation without regard to a determination of whether or
not the adversary process had begun.
In another decision on the same issue, United States v. Turzyn-
ski," the court viewed the law as requiring a suspect to be warned of
his constitutional rights as soon as the investigative machinery of
government, with the aim of ultimate conviction, became directed at
him. The Court in Turzynski found the Kohatsu distinction irrelevant
to the ascertainment of this event: "What matter if the culprit be
known before the crime or the crime before the culprit. In either case
the investigator is attempting to develop evidence for the purpose of
criminal prosecution and conviction."" The Kohatsu distinction was
further criticized by reason of the fact that a taxpayer subjected to
02 351 F.2d at 902-03.
63 Id. at 901.
64 see Lay, Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations, 43 Ind. L.J. 69,
73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Lay).
65
 See United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 853 (N.D. El. 1967); United
States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1969).
66 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. El. 1967).	 '
OT Id. at 852-53.
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a criminal tax fraud investigation is suspected of criminal acts prior to
the initiation of the criminal investigation. 68 As the court in Turzynski
pointed out, at least by the time the case is referred to the Intelligence
Division of the IRS, the taxpayer is suspected of fraud and possible
prosecution is contemplated.° The fact that the Kohatsu rationale
could be extended to other areas, of white collar crime, where the
identity of the suspect is known but the certainty that a crime has been
committed is not, forms the basis of additional criticism. During in-
vestigations to prove crimes such as the unauthorized practice of law
or attempted bribery, for example, it has been held by the Seventh
Circuit, in United States v. Dickerson," that Miranda would be er-
roneously limited by application of the Kohatsu rationale.
The implication of Kohatsu is that the accusatory stage is not
reached until arrest or indictment occurs.' However, the necessity
for arrest or indictment has been considered quite unjustifiable." After
the investigation has been concluded, the warnings may be worthless
since by then the taxpayer may have divulged incriminating informa-
tion." Secondly, arrests prior to and after indictment are virtually un-
known in tax fraud cases." Finally, after the investigation has been
completed, the case is processed, for purposes of review, through six
different levels of the IRS and the Justice Department before an indict-
ment is entered." Therefore, it has been suggested that all this review
obviously indicates that the accusatory stage has been reached prior to
indictment."
Writers77 and courts78 have agreed that the accusatory stage in a
non-custodial criminal tax fraud investigation is reached sometime
after the special agent enters the case but prior to the formal accusa-
tion. Because of the difficulty in pinpointing the exact time at which
the special agent subjectively feels prosecution should be recom-
68 Id. at 853.
60 Id.
70 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
71 See Lay, supra note 64, at 73.
72 Weiss, Special Agents Need Not Advise a Taxpayer of His Constitutional Rights,
25 J. Taxation 26, 27 (July, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Weiss].
73 Lay, supra note 64, at 73.
74 Weiss, supra note 72, at 27.
75 Id.
70 Id.
77
 Weiss, supra note 72, at 27; Lay, supra note 64, at 89-90; Comment, Constitu-
tional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Tax Fraud Investigation, 42 Tut. L. Rev. 862, 878
(1968). Because of the rigidity of the "first contact with the Intelligence Division" or
"entry of the special agent into the case" approach, and because the revenue agent could
merely extend the civil phase of the audit in order to obtain incriminating evidence, a
shift of emphasis in the nature of the investigation from civil to criminal has been sug-
gested as the best solution to the time of attachment for the Miranda warnings. See Note,
The Shift of Emphasis Theory: Constitutional Rights of Taxpayers in Criminal Fraud
Investigations in Light of Miranda v. Arizona, 20 Syr. L. Rev. 725, 736-37 (1969). This
also is the test used in United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (ND. Ill. 1967),
78 See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
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mended, the consensus among those asserting that Miranda is appli-
cable to non-custodial tax fraud investigations seems to be that entry
of the special agent into the case, or the first contact the Intelligence
Division has with the case is, practically, the best time to mark the
advent of the accusatory stage." Consquently, it is argued that the
Miranda rights should attach at this time.
Most of the courts that have passed on the issue of the Miranda
warnings in tax fraud investigations have placed more emphasis on
the factor of custody rather than on attempts to ascertain the advent
of the accusatory stage." The majority of the courts have taken a nar-
row view of Miranda and Escobedo, reasoning that unless the taxpayer
is held in custody, the rationale of those decisions—the compulsion
on the suspect to speak arising from his custodial surroundings—is
inapplicable to the tax fraud investigation. This was the situation, for
example, in United States v. Squeri,8' where the Second Circuit de-
clared that the Miranda opinion made clear that it was the custodial
surroundings in which the questioning took place that created the
necessity for the warnings. "This rationale is relevant only where the
questioning is conducted in custody or in circumstances similarly in-
herently compelling; it does not apply to questioning under other
circumstances in which there are no inherently compulsive pressures
to be overcome."" In reaching its result, the court in Squeri relied
to some extent on Mathis v. United States," a more recent decision
of the Supreme Court concerning the Miranda warnings.
79 Id.; see also note 77 supra.
88 Every court of appeals, except the Seventh Circuit, which has considered this issue
has found Miranda inapplicable when the investigation is non-custodial: Morgan v. United
States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967), Scblinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735 (1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 (1967); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st
Cir. 1968); United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Brow-
ney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Mains, 378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1967);
Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011
(1966); Hensley v. United States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Cohen v. United States,
405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 943 (1969). A majority of the district
courts have also held Miranda inapplicable to the non-custodial tax fraud investigation.
See cases cited in United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 851 n.2 (ND. M. 1967).
81 398 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1968).
82 Id. at 789.
88 391 U.S. 1 (1968). The court in Squeri, stated:
That the determinative factor is whether the interrogation was custodial,
rather than the degree of the government's suspicions, is dearly shown by Mathis
v. United States ... where the court held that the IRS agents were required to
give Miranda warnings . . . even though the interview was merely the initial
stage of a routine inquiry by civil agents.
398 F.2d at 790 n.l. The court supported this view of Mathis by referring to a footnote
in the Miranda decision, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4, in which the Miranda Court explained that
when it spoke of an investigation which focused on the accused in Escobedo it really
meant custodial interrogation. The Squeri court thus reasoned that the "compelling atmo-
sphere of the in-custody interrogation" was really the basis of Miranda and Escobedo. 398
F.2d at 790 n.1.
For a view that vigorously rejects this narrow interpretation of Miranda, see the re-
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In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that the Miranda warnings
were required when the defendant was questioned by revenue agents
of the IRS while he was in state custody on an unrelated charge."
Mathis had been visited in jail by a revenue agent concerning claims
for false tax refunds. During the visits he made oral and written
statements to the agent which were later used to convict him on the tax
charge. The Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, held that the
incriminating evidence was inadmissible, reasoning that Mathis was
"in custody" for purposes of Miranda. The Court observed that tax
investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions and, therefore,
such investigations are not immune from the Miranda warning re-
quirement where the defendant is in custody. 86 The Court rejected
the government's contention that Miranda was not applicable because
this was a routine tax investigation and custody was due to a separate
offense. The Court further stated that it was immaterial whether the
custody was in connection with the case under investigation." Unfor-
tunately, the Court in Mathis was not required to decide whether the
Miranda warnings should be required at some point during a non-
custodial tax fraud investigation. The Squeri opinion implies that cus-
tody was the crucial factor in Mathis.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Dickerson," has read
Mathis more broadly. In holding that Miranda is applicable to non-
custodial tax investigations after initial contact with the case by the
Intelligence Division of the IRS, the court in Dickerson relied on the
point stressed by the Supreme Court in Mathis, that is, that routine
tax investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, in rejecting
the Kohatsu distinction, and in deemphasizing the factor of custody."
Despite the view taken in Dickerson, it has been predicted that the
Mathis decision is likely to have a limited effect in convincing the
majority of circuit courts to deemphasize the significance of the cus-
tody factor." Indeed, this was the rationale in United States v.
Browney," where the Fourth Circuit held that a taxpayer is not en-
marks of Judge Will in United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967),
contending that the Supreme Court "did not intend the custody standard to be raised to
constitutional significance," Id. at 853. Judge Will favors interpretation of Miranda and
Escobedo to hold that the warnings are required at "the inception of the adversary pro-
cess," without regard to custody. Id. at 853.
84 391 U.S. at 4-5.
85 Id. at 4.
BO Id. at 4-5.
8T 413 F.2d 11.11 (7th Cir. 1969).
SS Id. at 1115.
89 See Lipton, Supreme Court's Decision in Mathis Likely to Have Very Limited Ef-
fect, 29 J. Taxation 32 (1968). Cf. Ghent, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation"
Within the Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of his Fed-
eral Constitutional Rights before Custodian Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565, 657 n.6,
(1970), wherein it is submitted that cases following the majority rule, although factually
distinguishable, have been weakened as authority by the holding in Mathis that tax in-
vestigations are not immune from the Miranda requirements.
50 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970).
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titled to be notified of the right to counsel prior to interviews by IRS
agents in which the taxpayer is not in custody or deprived of his free-
dom in any significant way, and where there is no evidence of coercion
or intimidation. The Fourth Circuit stated that Mathis was not appli-
cable since the taxpayer had not been in custody during the interviews.
It stated further that "[t]he Miranda decision was intended to apply
to interrogation of a suspect then in custody and to prevent coercion
by interrogators when a suspect is 'otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.' "" The court in Browney noted that
the weight of authority has viewed Miranda in this light."
Although the weight of authority stresses actual, formal custody,
and the Mathis opinion can be read to support such a limitation, the
phrase "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way," contained in the Miranda opinion, lends support to the argu-
ment that the Miranda warnings could be constitutionally required in
situations where formal physical custody is absent. This view is fur-
ther strengthened by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Orozco
v. Texas." There the defendant was involved in a shooting in a Dallas
cafe. He returned to his boarding house bedroom. At four o'clock in
the morning the police arrived, questioned him without giving him
the Miranda warnings, and obtained incriminating evidence later used
to convict him of murder. The Supreme Court, rejecting the state's
argument that the defendant was in familiar surroundings, held that
Miranda was applicable. The decision apparently did not require a
formal arrest for Miranda to apply, and there was nothing to indicate
whether the defendant in fact knew he was free to leave." Therefore,
the Orozco opinion can be read as requiring the Miranda warnings
even when no formal custody or arrest exists, so long as there is the
appearance that the defendant is deprived of his freedom in any sig-
nificant way. Arguably, the circumstances of an IRS fraud investiga-
tion could qualify as such a deprivation.
The Seventh Circuit, the only court requiring Miranda warnings
in non-custodial tax fraud investigations, has viewed the Orozco case
in this light." In Dickerson, a special agent interviewed the taxpayer
at the latter's place of business without advising the taxpayer of
his constitutional rights or of the fact that the investigation had be-
come criminal.°° The court considered the basis of the Supreme Court's
decision in Miranda to be the opportunity to exercise or waive intel-
ligently one's constitutional rights." Ignorance of one's rights could
not be deemed a valid waiver." With these premises in mind, the
01 Id. at 51.
92 Id.
Oa 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
04 See United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111, 1114, n.4 (7th Cir. 1969).
00 Id. at 1114.
9° See text at note 90 supra.
97 413 F.2d at 1113-114.
98 Id. at 1114.
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court noted that the taxpayer could easily be under a misappre-
hension in a tax fraud investigation." If he is not informed that there
has been a shift from civil to criminal emphasis, be is likely to believe
that he is obligated to supply information on account of a possible civil
deficiency.'" Moreover, when questioned by government agents with-
out being warned of his rights, he is likely to feel restrained from
walking out on the investigators or from asking them to leãve his
home or office.'" Lastly, the average citizen would likely think that
only the non-cooperative would be prosecuted. 1°" Incriminating state-
ments obtained under such circumstances characteristic of a non-cus-
todial tax fraud investigation, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, would be
"equally violative of constitutional protections as a custodial confes-
sion extracted without proper warning."'" The court, therefore, held
that the Miranda warnings must be given to the taxpayer by the reve-
nue agent or the special agent at the inception of the first contact with
the taxpayer after the case has been transferred to the Intelligence
Division.` 04
One further point made in Dickerson is worthy of mention. The
court pointed out that in nearly all the other courts of appeals and
district court cases that passed on the Miranda issue with respect to
the criminal tax investigation, either some form or portion of the
Miranda warnings were given, or an attorney was present, or the
court in question arbitrarily chose the strict physical custody view of
Miranda.'" Thus, despite the weight of authority to the contrary,
factual distinctions in future cases indicate that more litigation over
the accrual of Miranda rights in tax investigations is likely. By way of
illustration, in Dickerson, which held Miranda applicable to non-cus-
todial tax interrogations, the taxpayer was indicted on the basis of
information obtained during five interviews at which he was not once
warned of his rights nor accompanied by counsel.'" In Turzynski,
which held similarly, no warnings were given nor was the taxpayer
informed that the investigation had shifted to a criminal nature. In
contradistinction, in Squeri and Browney, both of which ruled Miranda
inapplicable in non-custodial tax fraud cases, there was some form
of warnings. In Squeri, the taxpayer was informed of his right to re-
main silent and, moreover, he bad his accountant present at the inter-
99 Id. at 1116.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1116-117.
105 Id, at 1114-115 nn.7, 8, 9. See also the cases collected in Ghent, What Constitutes
"Custodial Interrogation" Within the Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect
be Informed of his Federal Constitutional Rights before Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.
3d 565, 647-57 (1970). A review of the tax cases cited therein supports the observation
of the Dickerson court to the effect that most of the cases following the majority rule
are either factually distinguishable or turn solely on the factor of formal custody.
100 413 F.2d at 1113.
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view.107 In Browney, the taxpayer was informed of his right to silence
before all interviews. 108
 It seems, therefore, that if no warnings what-
soever are given, and the taxpayer is kept in the dark as to the nature
of the investigation after it has shifted to criminal, an argument that
Miranda should apply has strong merit.
The IRS apparently has indicated, either as a precaution against
judicial disfavor or because it too recognizes that there might be some
merit to the application of Miranda, that some warnings should be
given to the taxpayer when the special agent enters the case. Since
May, 1967, it has required its special agents to give the first three
Miranda warnings.'" The fourth—that an indigent accused is entitled
to have counsel appointed—is not required."° Most of the cases that
have reached the appellate courts to date concerned interviews that
were conducted before Miranda was decided."' To some extent, there-
fore, the weight of authority on the issue may have been influenced by
the fact that the agents did what was proper at the time. Consequently,
in balancing the administrative interest with that of the taxpayer, this
factor may have been significant. In the future, the recent IRS policy
requiring special agents to give a modified Miranda warning at first
contact with the taxpayer should, as cases come up in which it has
been given, probably rigidify the position of those courts which feel
Miranda is not required in non-custodial tax investigations. However,
as was pointed out in Dickerson, IRS policy does not obviate the re-
sponsibility of the court to render judgment in accordance with its
understanding of the intent of Miranda.112
It is submitted that a narrow view of "custody" unjustifiably dis-
regards the taxpayer's interest. The possible misapprehension with
respect to criminal possibilities, plus the likelihood of subjective com-
pulsion which may face a taxpayer during a tax fraud investigation,
militate against adoption of a narrow standard. The rationale of the
First Circuit in Morgan v. United States"" to the effect that "to some
extent persons must be prepared to look after themselves," 114
 is in-
appropriate where constitutional rights may be waived through ig-
norance.
A broader view of Miranda's "custodial interrogation" rationale,
judicially applied on a case-by-case basis, is more appealing. Such a
view would be more equitable and more flexible that the strict, formal-
istic view of "custody" which necessarily and unjustifiably would not
107 398 F.2d at 787.
108
 421 F.2d at 49-50.
1 °3 See United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111, 1117 n.13 (7th Cir. 1969).
110
 Query whether the fourth requirement is necessary. How many taxpayers sus-
pected of tax evasion are indigent?
111
 See, e.g., United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970) which, although
decided in 1970, dealt with interviews conducted during the 1963-1966 period.
112 413 F.2d at 1117 n.13.
113 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967).
114
 Id. at 508.
1190
TAX FRAUD AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
require warnings in cases where high degrees of subjective compulsion
could arise even though the taxpayer were not in custody. The test
enunciated in Browney can be read as affording this broader, more
flexible test. In Browney, the court held that the Miranda rights did
not accrue if the defendant were neither in custody, nor deprived of
his freedom in any significant way, nor subject to coercion or intimida-
tion." Judge Sobeloff, concurring in the result reached in Browney,
understood the test enunciated by the majority to mean that the
Miranda rights were not to be confined to deprivations of physical
freedom, but would arise in "any set of circumstances that robs a
person of freedom of will or independence of judgment."'" Judge
Sobeloff recognized and pointed out that such an approach would
necessitate case-by-case litigation—a situation which, he noted, the
Dickerson court through its experience had found unsatisfactory. He
felt, therefore, that although the majority had reached the correct
result on the facts of Browney (owing to the fact that some warnings
were given), he nevertheless urged that the Fourth Circuit not foreclose
adoption of the Dickerson approach at least until a fact situation
similar to the latter case arose in the circuit. Judge Sobeloff emphasized
the sound reasoning and practicality behind the "first contact with the
Intelligence Divison or special agent" approach in stating his prefer-
ence for it over the broader view of applying Miranda case by case. It
is submitted that the broader view of Miranda applied to each case is
certainly preferable to the strict custody approach. Moreover, the
"flood of litigation" specter or the difficulty of case-by-case determina-
tion is exaggerated. But the real issue is whether a loose construction
of "custody," applied on a case-by-case basis, is better than the "first
contact approach," which arguably may facilitate evasion by creating
a quagmire of constitutionally unwarranted conditions.
The "first contact with the Intelligence Division" rationale does
have some disadvantages. It may balance the equities too far in favor
of the taxpayer with the possibility that more fraud may be attempted.
Taxpayers may find that it is easier to stymie the IRS. In addition, this
approach could engender between the IRS and the courts the same type
of antagonism created between the police and the courts as a result
of the "in custody" warning requirements. Why should seemingly
well educated special agents be required to parrot these warnings at
the initial stages of an investigation where merely a possibility of
criminality exists? Furtherfore, this "first contact" approach may be
conducive to the administrative structure of the IRS, but presumably
the rationale of such a rule could be extended to other government
agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission or the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. Would the courts have to tailor an analogous
rule for each government agency that conducts non-custodial investiga-
tions which could result in either civil or criminal sanctions?
115 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970).
116 Id. at 52.
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Despite these and other disadvantages, which arguably are ex-
aggerated, it is submitted that the "first contact" approach as adopted
in Dickerson is the best guarantee of the taxpayer's rights in the non-
custodial fraud investigation. It is easy and practical in application. It
relieves the IRS of the difficulty of the subjective determination of
Miranda's accrual. It informs the taxpayer of the sanctions possibly
facing him and guards against his misapprehension with respect to the
nature of the investigation. It insures against unwitting waivers of
constitutional rights. Even if adoption of this approach goes a bit too
far in the taxpayer's favor, it is preferable to the adoption of a less
practical approach which is rooted in the fear that a taxpayer's knowl-
edge of his rights is a threat to effective law enforcement. After all,
the rationale behind the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination is that no person should aid in his own conviction. Presently,
a strong argument can be made that this is exactly what will occur in
a non-custodial criminal tax fraud investigation unless the Miranda
warnings are required to be given when the criminal investigation
begins. Hence, it would be beneficial to the public, to the taxpayer
being investigated, and to the IRS if the United States Supreme Court
resolves this issue the next time it arises before that Court. 111
III. THE ABILITY OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO OBTAIN
DISCOVERY OF THE TAXPAYER'S BOOKS AND RECORDS
The fact that a tax fraud investigation has both civil and criminal
possibilities raises an important issue pertaining to the authority of
the IRS to obtain discovery of the taxpayer's books and records. The
issue is whether an administrative subpoena issued by the IRS may be
validly used to obtain evidence for use in the criminal aspect of the
fraud case. Another problem in the discovery area is the "required
records doctrine." This doctrine concerns the taxpayer's Fifth Amend-
ment rights and is, therefore, related constitutionally to the Miranda
problem previously discussed. It thus bears indirectly upon the civil-
criminal tax fraud relationship. The statutory powers of the IRS in
the discovery area will be considered. This analysis will be followed by
a close scrutiny of the administrative summons and the problems
facing the taxpayer because of the "required records doctrine."
Section 6001 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that every
person liable for any tax under the Code "keep such records," "render
such statements," or "make such returns" as the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate may prescribe, in order that his tax liability
may be ascertained 118 The regulations prescribed by the Secretary
117 In his dissent from denial of certiorari on this issue in Thomas v. United States,
386 U.S. 975 (1967), justice Douglas said: "This is not an in-custody case, but it is a
coercive examination of a taxpayer at a critical preliminary hearing, so to speak, and the
question presented apparently is a recurring one." Since a more conservative view in the
law enforcement area is apparently developing within the Burger Court, a reconsideration
of a future grant of certiorari on this issue is unlikely.
118 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6001.
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require that permanent books of account or records as are sufficient to
establish the amount of gross income, deductions or credits be kept by
any person subject to tax."° Less formal records are required in the
case of farmers and wage earners.'" The records required to be kept
must be made available at all times for inspection by IRS personnel."'
Generally, these required records have to be kept for at least four years
after the tax to which the records relate is due or paid—whichever is
later.'22
 Anyone who willfully fails to keep the required records, or to
supply information, is subject to a $10,000 fine, a year's imprisonment,
or both.'"
Section 7602 of the Code gives to the IRS administrative subpoena
power for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of any return, mak-
ing a return where none has been made, or determining the liability of
any person with respect to the payment or collection of any .tax 124 This
statute provides the IRS with authority to examine "any books, papers,
records, or other data which may be relevant or material. . . ." 12" It
also enables the IRS to summon a person liable for a tax or its collec-
tion, or any officer or employee of such a person having possession or
custody of his books of account."' Any other person may also be
summoned to produce records, papers, books or other data, or to give
testimony under oath relevant to the taxpayer's liability. The taxpayer
himself may be summoned to appear and give testimony under oath.'"
The appropriate United States District Court may enforce an IRS
administrative summons by appropriate process if it is ignored.' 28
The dual civil and criminal nature of the tax fraud investigation
raises some doubt as to the proper use of the IRS administrative sum-
mons. As long as the civil liability is also being investigated, the courts
have held that a concurrent criminal investigation does not preclude
judicial enforcement of the IRS summons."' But section 7602 contains
no language to support such a result. It speaks only of the ascertain-
ment and collection of the civil tax liability.'" It makes no mention of
criminal investigations. Furthermore, the fact that criminal investiga-
tion is the province of the special agents, and that their statutory duties
do not include the responsibility for issuing a summons, suggests that
110 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Regs. § 1.6001-1(a).
120
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Rags. 1.6001-1(b).
121
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Regs. § 1.6001-1(d).
122
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Regs. § I.6001-1(c) (2).
128 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 7203.
124 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602.
120 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, [1 7602(1).
126 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602 (2) .
127 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602(3).
128 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7604, 7402 (b).
129 See, Lipton, The Relationship Between the Civil and Criminal Penalties for Tax
Frauds, 1968 U. of Ill. L. F. 527, 533 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Lipton]; Wild v
.
United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928
(D. Md. 1968).
190
 Lipton, supra note 129, at 533 n.40.
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Congress did not intend the IRS administrative subpoena to be used
to gather evidence of criminality."' It has been suggested, therefore,
that since the subpoena power of the government may be used only to
the extent and in the manner permitted by statute, the enforcement of
the IRS summons resulting in the procurement of evidence for use in
the criminal aspect of the case is error and exceeds the statutory
authority."'
The use of the IRS administrative summons during a criminal
investigation has also been deemed objectionable because it arguably
violates the Fourth Amendment."' The latter requires probable cause
alleged under oath or affirmation before a detached magistrate as a
prerequisite to issuance of a warrant. An administrative subpoena
issued by the IRS bears no such characteristics. Apparently to rebut
this constitutional difficulty, IRS special agents have on occasion testi-
fied that the tax fraud investigation has as its main purpose the deter-
mination of the correct civil tax liability."' But this assertion is
questionable because it is inconsistent with the admitted policy of the
•IRS to place overriding emphasis on the criminal aspects of the fraud
investigation while holding the civil aspect in abeyance.'s 6
Because the use of the IRS administrative subpoena in conjunc-
tion with a criminal tax fraud investigation may be in excess of statu-
tory authority and is constitutionally doubtful, limitations upon its
use have been suggested. One commentator has expressed the view
that the enforcement of such a summons should be subject to the con-
dition that any evidence elicited thereby be barred from use in a
criminal prosecution.' 3° The evidence obtained via the use of the
summons would be admissible only for purposes of determining the
civil tax liability. Since, as will be discussed below, it is questionable
whether even a court may constitutionally authorize discovery of the
taxpayer's books and records for purposes of a criminal investigation,
and since the statutory construction argument and Fourth Amendment
consideration appear logically and persuasively weighted in favor of
the taxpayer, it is submitted that the IRS administrative summons
should indeed be limited strictly to civil fraud or civil liability purposes,
and that any evidence obtained from the taxpayer by its use should be
inadmissible in the criminal aspects of the case. Under the statutory
construction issue, it could also be maintained that the use of the IRS
summons to acquire evidence of criminality from persons other than the
taxpayer is unauthorized and should also be restricted. However, be-
cause the constitutional issue is not so directly involved as to persons
131 Id.
132 Id.
183 Lipton, supra note 129, at 533 nn.40, 41.
184 Id. at nn.40-43.
128 Id.
138 Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigation, 45 F.R.D. 323, 329
(1965). See also, Hincheliff v. Clarke, 371 F,2d 697 (6th Cir. 1967).
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other than the taxpayer (since they are not being summoned with a
view to being prosecuted), an argument to limit the use of the summons
in this context is less persuasive.
No one would argue that the records required to be kept pursuant
to section 6001 could not be subpoenaed for purposes of civil liability—
either by administrative summons or judicial process. As has been
pointed out, the use of the administrative summons to obtain evidence
for the criminal case is of doubtful validity. But even under a judicially
granted summons meeting the requirement of probable cause pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment, it is still not clear whether the section 6001
records may be constitutionally subpoenaed. At issue is the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects these required records or whether the "required records doctrine"
excepts the section 6001 records from the protection of the Amendment.
The required records doctrine originated in Shapiro v. United
States.'"There, the United States Supreme Court held, by a vote of
5 to 4, that books and records required by law to be kept and main-
tained under the Emergency Price Control Act became "public" records
subject to subpoena, and that the immunity section of the Emergency
Price Control Act would not protect the defendant against the use of
such records as evidence against him in a criminal proceeding. The
Court stated its rationale as follows: "[T]he privilege which exists as
to private papers cannot be maintained in relation to 'records required
by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of
transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regula-
tion and the enforcement of restrictions validly established.' " 1 " The
Supreme Court has never applied the Shapiro required records exception
to tax records.'" Moreover, the Court in Shapiro mentioned twenty-
six other regulatory statutes to which the doctrine might apply, but it
did not include the Internal Revenue Code. 14° Nevertheless, a number
of courts have extended the doctrine to tax cases.
In Falsone v. United States,' the IRS served an administrative
summons on the taxpayer's accountant. The latter was directed to
appear before an agent to give testimony relating to the tax liability of
his client and to bring certain books and records pertaining to the tax-
payer's returns. The accountant refused to produce the records and
asked the district court to quash the summons. The request was re-
fused. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the records
had to be produced even though a Florida statute considered the ac-
countant-client relationship confidential. The court stated that the
187 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
130
 id. at 33.
130
 Pemberton, Tax Fraud Investigations and the Required Records Doctrine, 46
Taxes 209, 211 (1968).
14° 335 U.S. at 6 n.4.
141 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
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power granted to the Commissioner of the IRS by section 6001 was
"inquisitorial in character" and comparable to the power vested in fed-
eral grand juries. 192
 The court even went so far as to say that the rec-
ords of a taxpayer, even if in the hands of an attorney for purposes of
consultation, cannot be regarded as privileged. Otherwise, the court rea-
soned, interference with the administration of justice would be effected
simply by transferring important papers back and forth between
attorney and client.'"
In Beard v. United States,'" the Fourth Circuit ruled by implica-
tion that tax records required to be kept by the Internal Revenue Code
fell within the rule enunciated in Shapiro. Beard involved a prosecution
for willfull filing of a false return. At the trial, the jury was instructed
that it could consider the defendant's failure or refusal to produce his
books and records for inspection when requested to do so by IRS agents
pursuant to the statute. The defendant, a bookmaker, appealed, con-
tending that the instruction was erroneous on the ground that it vio-
lated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court rejected this contention.
In United States v. Clancy,145
 the Seventh Circuit held that books
and records required by law to be kept and maintained are not private
papers which are immune from seizure under a valid search warrant.
Here the defendants were licensed gamblers who were charged with
evasion of wagering excise taxes in connection with a gambling operation
they had established at an unlicensed location. IRS agents acting under
a valid, authorized search warrant obtained evidence subsequently used
to convict the defendants. It consisted of gambling books, records and
other paraphernalia. The defendants contended these were private
papers within the protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The
Court held they were not, stating "this exception to the privilege against
self-incrimination and searches and seizures, has come to be known as
the 'required records exception' and has been recognized in numerous
cases. ,,140
In Stern v. Robinson, 147
 a United States District Court specifically
held that the records of a taxpayer required to be kept and produced
by the federal income tax laws were not entitled to Fifth Amendment
protection. The court discarded the taxpayer's first contention by
stating that Miranda and Escobedo were limited substantially to in-
custody interrogation.'" The court, although citing it for support, ex-
pressly noted that Shapiro did not involve a prosecution under the taxlaws.3.49
142 Id. at 742.
143 Id. at 739.
144 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1955).
148 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960).
146 Id. at 631.
147 262 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Tenn. 1966).
148 Id. at 15.
149 Id. at 16. The defendant appealed but since this was a pretrial motion, no appel-
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned decisions, there is some au-
thority for the proposition that the required records doctrine does not
overcome the protection of the Fifth Amendment. In United States v.
Remain,'" defendant-wagering operators moved to supress evidence
obtained by IRS through examination of the defendants' books and
records. The issue was whether the Fifth Amendment protected the
•records even though the tax laws required them to be kept. The govern-
ment contended that the required records exception of Shapiro exempted
all records required by law to be maintained by all persons subject to
the federal excise tax on wagers. The court distinguished Shapiro fac-
tually and noted that there the defendant did not assert or insist upon
his privilege against self-incrimination. 161 The court also rejected
Clancy as controlling. It stated: "We cannot interpret either of such
decisions as abolishing the protection of the Fifth Amendment with
respect to a person's books and records merely because one or more of
innumerable state and federal laws may require records of that type
to be kept.'""
In addition to Remolif, several other courts and legal writers have
argued that the required records doctrine of Shapiro has no place in the
tax field.' 38 The most compelling reasons posited in support of this
position have been: (1) that Shapiro involved an emergency measure
and the national interest required strict enforcement; (2) that not-
withstanding the emergency conditions, Shapiro was decided only by
a 5 to 4 vote; (3) that the Supreme Court has never applied the
doctrine to tax cases and did not cite the Internal Revenue Code among
the statutes it cited as examples to which the required records doctrine
might apply; and (4) that the Supreme Court impliedly recognized
limitations on the doctrine when it said in Shapiro that the govern-
ment's power to require the maintenance and production of records for
inspection by an administrative agency could be exercised constitution-
ally only when there existed a sufficient relationship between the activ-
ity sought to be regulated and the public concern."' This sufficient
relationship might exist, the Court implied, where the government could
forbid or regulate the basis activity concerned. Thus, the required
records doctrine arguably has been properly applied in liquor, narcotics
and gambling cases.'" However, since the tax laws are designed for
revenue-collecting purposes, it could be contended that application of
the required records doctrine to these laws would be an unwarranted
late jurisdiction existed. Stern v. Robinson, 391 F.2d 601 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1027 (1968).
150 227 F. Supp. 420 (D. Nev. 1964).
151 Id. at 423.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., In the Matter of Daniels, 149 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Blumberg
v. United States, 222 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal
Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323 (1968).
154 See Pemberton, supra note 139, at 211.
155 Id.
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extension of Shapiro. One writer has stated that, although many lawyers
and some judges are unaware of the taxpayer's right to withhold tax
records in fraud investigations, even the IRS has conceded that such
records are privileged."
Two recent Supreme Court decisions may be read as further
supporting the position that the required records doctrine has no place
in the tax area. In Marchetti v. United States' and Grosso v. United
States,158
 both 1968 cases, the Court further explained the circum-
stances under which the doctrine could be applied. In Grosso, the
Court stated that the purpose of the statute involved must be regula-
tory, that the records must be the type the regulated party customarily
keeps, and further, that the records must have "public aspects" which
makes them analogous to public documents.'" In Marchetti, the Court
implied that a mere record-keeping requirement does not "stamp
information with a public character." 160
A strong argument can be made that tax records do not satisfy
the conditions recently enunciated by the Supreme Court. The primary
purpose of the revenue laws is revenue collection. Not all the records
required by the tax laws would necessarily be customarily kept by
taxpayers. Finally, even though the Internal Revenue Service represents
society as a whole, it is questionable whether the public at large has a
right to see one's tax returns or whether the IRS has a right to divulge
a taxpayer's records to any citizen who might so request. Therefore, it
is submitted that the required records doctrine should be excluded
from use in the area of criminal tax fraud litigation.
CONCLUSION
The civil and the primary criminal tax fraud sanctions are related
by identity of concept and factual element. These sanctions are further
fused by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The interrelation between
civil and criminal tax fraud gives a tax fraud investigation a dual
nature. This duality generates a significant legal issue as to the accrual
or attachment of the constitutional rights set forth in the Miranda
decision. Finally, this duality also contributes to the supposed ability
of the Internal Revenue Service to obtain discovery of the taxpayer's
books and records via the administrative summons and the required
records doctrine.
A thorough examination of the civil-criminal fraud relationship
and the characteristics of a tax fraud investigation suggests that with-
out a definite standard for application of the Miranda warnings,
and without a clarification of the administrative subpoena process and
106 Lipton, supra note 153, at 332-33. Here Lipton directed with particularity his
disapproval to the decision in Stern v. Robinson, note 149 supra.
1" 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
158 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
180 Id. at 68.
160 390 U.S. at 57.
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the required records doctrine, the constitutional rights of a taxpayer
subjected to the non-custodial tax fraud investigation will continue to
be in jeopardy. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will soon consider
the weighty issues generated by the civil-criminal tax fraud relation-
ship.
WILLIAM H. ISE
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